TESTING FOR EFFICIENCY: A POLICY ANALYSIS WITH PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS by Salhofer, Klaus et al.
 
Proceedings of the 25
th International Conference of Agricultural Economists (IAAE)  16 ￿ 22 August 2003 
ISBN Number: 0-958-46098-1  Durban, South Africa 
Proceedings produced by: Document Transformation Technologies   Conference Organised by: Event Dynamics 







3 and Friedrich Schneider
4 
 
1Environmental Economics, Resource Economics, and Agricultural Policy Research Group,  
Technical University of Munich, Alte Akademie 14, Germany. E-mail: salhofer@wzw.tum.de 
2Department of Economics, Politics, and Law, University of Natural Resources and  
Applied Life Sciences, Vienna 
3Joanneum Research, Vienna 





The study evaluates the efficiency of government intervention using a vertical structured model including 
imperfectly competitive agricultural input markets, the bread grain market, and the imperfectly competitive 
food industry. To test for policy efficiency the actually observed bread grain policy is compared to a 
hypothetical efficient policy.  To account for the sensitivity of the results in regard to the model parameter 
values computer-intensive simulation procedures and surface response functions are utilized.   
 




As a rule, governments defend their policy as efficiently meeting stated objectives. The aim of this study is 
to take this to an empirical test. In particular, it is analyzed if the market interventions into the Austrian bread 
grain market before the EU accession were designed to efficiently meet the main stated objectives. To do so, 
the actually observed policy is compared to a hypothetical optimal policy using the same instruments, but at 
optimal levels.   
 
In the next section, the official objectives relevant to the past bread gain policy in Austria and the policy 
instruments are reviewed. In Section 3 a vertically-structured model including imperfectly competitive 
agricultural input markets, the bread grain market, and the imperfectly competitive food industry is 
developed.  Since the results crucially depend on the model parameters a range rather than (one or a few) 
specific values are derived for each model parameter.  In Section 4 the simulation model and assumed 
parameter ranges are used to test for the efficiency of the bread grain policy under uncertainty.  Section 5 
provides a sensitivity analysis of the results.  Section 6 gives a summary and discussion.   
 
OBJECTIVES AND INSTRUMENTS OF BREAD GRAIN POLICY 
 
Thus, official objectives of farm policy as stated in national agricultural legislation are manifold there also 
appears to be a high degree of unanimity about the goals of agricultural policy among developed countries.  
Following Winters (1990) in analyzing the objectives of agricultural support in OECD countries one may 
identify four categories of farm policy goals:  i) support and stabilization of farm income;  ii) self-sufficiency 
with agricultural (food) products;  iii) regional, community and family farm aspects;  iv) the environment.  
There is not much doubt among agricultural policy analysts that farm income support has been the most 
important goal over the last decades (Josling, 1974; Gardner, 1992).   
 
In general, Austrian agricultural legislation is not different from other developed countries.  The overall 
goals of agricultural policy are stated in paragraph 1 of the "Landwirtschaftsgesetz" (Agricultural Status) and 
perfectly fit in the four categories mentioned above.   The particular objectives of bread grain market interventions are stated in the "Marktordnungsgesetz" and 
can be summarized as:  i) safeguarding domestic production,  ii) stabilizing flour and bread prices;  and iii) 
securing a sufficient supply and quality of bread grain, bread grain products and animal feedstuffs.   
 
Utilized policy instruments to meet stated policy objectives can be illustrated by means of Figure 1 with Dfo 
being the domestic demand for bread grain for food production and D being the total domestic demand for 
bread grain including demand for feeding purposes.  Initial domestic supply is represented by S and supply 
including a fertilizer tax by St.  World market price is assumed to be perfectly elastic at Pw.  Farmers obtain a 
high floor price (PD) for a specific contracted quantity (or quota) QQ.  Since farmers have to pay a co-
responsibility levy (CLPD) the net producer price is PD - CLPD.  Quantities, which exceed the quota can be 
delivered at a reduced price PE.  Again, farmers￿ net floor price is PE - CLPE, with CLPE being the co-
responsibility levy for bread grain beyond the quota.  Food processors have to buy bread grain at the high 
price PD, while the price of bread grain for feeding purposes is PE. Therefore, domestic demand for bread 
grain in food production is QD, domestic demand for feeding purposes is QE ￿ QD, total domestic demand is 


























As illustrated in Figure 2, the Austrian agribusiness of bread grains is modelled by a log-linear, three-stage 
vertically-structured model (A full description of the model is given in Name Withheld, 2002).  The first 
stage includes markets of agricultural input factors used for bread grains production. Since 95% of farmland 
is owned by farmers and 86% of labour in the agricultural sector is self-employed, these two resources are 
assumed to be offered solely by farmers. On the contrary, investment goods (mainly machinery and 
buildings), and operating inputs (mainly fertiliser, pesticides, and seed) are produced by industries. Export 
and import of input factors is not considered. Hence, it is assumed that domestic consumption of input 
factors equals domestic production. This is certainly correct for land and agricultural labour but might not be 
exactly accurate for industrially produced input factors. However, in both cases a big share of domestic 
consumption was produced domestically  
Figure 2.  Model structure. 
 
At the second stage, input factors of the first stage are used to produce bread grains assuming a Cobb-
Douglas technology. The first and the second stage are linked by the assumption that agricultural firms 
maximise their profits.  
 
At the third stage the produced quantities of bread grains are used for food production, animal feed, and 
exports. Firms, which process food combine bread grains with other input factors of investment goods, and 
industrial labour assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology. Again, the second and the third stage are linked by 
the assumption that food industry firms maximise their profits. Import and export of processed bread grains 
do not play an important role. Hence, it is assumed that domestic demand of processed bread grains equals 
domestic supply. Quantities of bread grains which are neither used for food production nor for animal feed 
are exported.  
 
The farm sector is assumed to be competitive. This assumption is justified by the large number of firms 
producing bread grains and by the fact that farmers take prices given by government. Input industries and 
food industry as defined in the model are conglomerates of separate industries. Investment goods include all 
kind of agricultural machinery as well as agricultural buildings. Operating inputs include fertiliser, 
pesticides, seeds, fuel, lubricants, etc. The food sector comprises wholesale buyers, mills, as well as the 
bread, noodle and baker’s ware industries. For this reason, the market structure of these aggregations of 
industries is hard to define. To account for this, the model includes a conjectural variation parameter. 
Varying this parameter imitates different market structures and different levels of market power ranging 
from perfect competition to monopoly (e.g. Maier, 1993).  
 
To run the model 32 parameter values are necessary. While 13 values of these 32 parameters are 
endogenously derived in the calibration process, 19 specific parameter values have to be assumed.  In 
contrast to most empirical studies of this kind we do not assume one (or a few) specific value(s) for each 
parameter, but rather assume each parameter to be in a plausible range.   The upper (a) and lower (b) bounds of these ranges are based on extensive literature and data analysis 
(described in detail in Name Withheld, 2001)).  
 
Two alternative distributions are assumed between the upper and lower bounds:  i) a uniform distribution 
U(a, b);  and ii) a symmetric normal distribution N(µ, σ,) with µ = (a+b)/2 and σ = (µ−a)/1.96, which is 
truncated at a and b.   
 
On the base of these parameter ranges, 10,000 independent draws are taken for every single parameter and 
each alternative distribution. Hence, we derive 10,000 parameter sets including 19 elements for each 
alternative distribution, separately. These parameter sets are used to derive 10.000 simulation (and 




As discussed above, the main objective of agricultural policy in Austria, as in most developed countries, was 
to support farm income.  Beside income redistribution, securing a sufficient supply and quality of bread grain 
products and animal feedstuffs was the most important goal of Austria’s bread grain policy in particular.  
Given this, we may simplify government￿s decision problem as trying to maximize social welfare given a 
socially demanded level of farmer￿s welfare and self-sufficiency. (Note, that equally one could describe 
government￿s decision problem as minimizing social cost, given a certain amount of wealth transfers to 
farmers and self-sufficiency.)  Assuming that the socially demanded transfer level is reflected in the actually 
observed transfer level, that self-sufficiency is given when domestic supply is greater or equal domestic 
demand, and that the policy instruments available to government are the actually used instruments, 









,       (1) 
where W is social welfare (measured as the sum of welfare of all domestic social groups affected by the 
policy including upstream and downstream industries, bread grains farmers, consumers, taxpayers and 
buyers of bread grains for feeding purposes),  BF U  is the welfare level of bread grain farmers, 
A
BF U  is the 
actually observed welfare level of bread grain farmers, and Qx are bread grain exports.   
 
The official goal of introducing a tax on fertilizer was soil protection and hence environmentally motivated.  
For simplicity, it is assumed that this environmental goal is separable from other goals and optimally met by 
the current level of fertilizer tax.  Hence, government can freely choose the levels of five policy instruments 
(PE, CLPE, PQD, CLPQD, QQ) to maximize welfare under given constraints.   
 
Utilizing the described simulation model, assumed distributions of parameter values, and welfare measures, 
the nonlinear optimization problem (1) is solved numerically for 2 times 10,000 alternative parameter sets 
utilizing GAMS software (Brooke et al. 1988).  As a result two alternative distributions of the optimal 
welfare levels as well as the optimal policy instrument levels and combinations are derived.  
 
Utilizing the same model, parameter sets, and welfare measures, but taking the world market price of bread 
grain one can simulate a hypothetical nonintervention scenarios.  Thus, the social cost of the optimal policy 
are measured as SC
*=W
* - W
W where W* and W
W are the welfare level in the optimal situation and in the 
world market price situation, respectively.  Similarly, assuming plugging in the actually observed prices into 





A is the actual welfare level.  Finally, the relative social cost (RSC) give the share by which the social cost 
could have been reduced, if the government would have used an optimal combination and levels of policy 
instruments RSC = (SC
A - SC
*)/SC
A.  This gives a measure of how close the actual policy is to the optimal 
policy.   
 
The empirical results for the assumption of normally distributed parameters are summarized in Table 1.  At the mean the social cost of the actually policy are measured to be ￿ 159 million (about 42% of the value 
of bread grain production) with a standard deviation of ￿  23 million.  In 95% (9,500 cases) of our 10,000 
simulations the social cost are in a range of ￿ 116 million to ￿ 206 million.  The 75% probability interval is 
between ￿ 131 million ￿ 188 million.   
 
Table 1.  Social cost of actual and optimal policy given a normal distribution of parameter values. 
 
        95% Probability interval  75% Probability interval
 Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  from  to  from  to 
Social cost of actual 
policy 
159.3 158.6 23.2  116.3  206.2  131.4  188.4 
Social cost of optimal 
policy 
91.2  91.1  24.0 45.0 138.7  61.7  120.9 
Percentage improvement 0.44  0.42  0.08 0.32 0.63  0.35  0.53 
 
In the case of the optimal policy the social cost are significantly smaller with a mean of ￿ 91 million, a 
standard deviation of ￿ 24 million, a 95% probability interval between ￿ 45 million and ￿ 139 million, and a 
75% interval between ￿ 62 million and ￿ 121 million.  Therefore, by using the same instruments at different 
levels government could have reduced the social cost on average by ￿ 68 million, about 44% of the actual 
social cost, and with a 95% (75%) probability between 32% (35%) and 63% (53%). 
 
Assuming a uniform distribution of the parameter values between the upper and lower boundary does not 
change the mean and median significantly (Table 2), but certainly causes higher standard deviations and 
hence wider probability intervals. 
 
Table 2.  Social cost of actual and optimal policy given a uniform distribution of parameter values. 
 
        95% Probability interval 75% Probability interval 
 Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  from  to  from  to 
Social cost of actual 
policy 
158.9 157.2  30.4  104.3  221.5  122.2  197.5 
Social cost of 
optimal policy 
90.2 89.3  31.6  31.4  152.8  51.5  129.7 
Percentage 
improvement 




To analyze the sensitivity of the RSC with respect to the model parameters, surface response functions are 
utilized (Zhao et al. 2000).  The nonlinear relationships between RSC and model parameters are described by 
its second order approximation, i.e. a quadratic polynomial, comprising a constant, the 19 parameters pari, 
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with c0, ci, and dij being regression coefficients, and e an error term.   Equation (2) is estimated using the 10,000 parameter sets drawn from the uniform distributions and the 
implied RSC-values.  However, to exclude extreme parameter combinations the lowest and highest 2.5% of 
RSC-values are omitted, leaving 9,500 observations. 
 
OLS-estimation of the response function exhibits an extremely good fit (R
2 = 0.993) as well as medium to 
high levels of significance for a majority of coefficients.  About 57% of the coefficients are significant at the 
99% level, 3% at the 95% level, and 12% at the 90% level.  
 
Table 3. Sensitivity Analysis. 
 
  Monte Carlo-results (n=9500)  Evaluation at parameter means 
Par.  Mean  Median S.E. Min Max Avg. RSCmin RSCmax ∆(RSC)
αA  -0.007  -0.005 0.018 -0.092 0.055 -0.006 0.418 0.417 -0.001
αB  -0.035  -0.033 0.055 -0.245 0.168 -0.036 0.420 0.415 -0.004
αG  -0.001  -0.002 0.018 -0.064 0.087 -0.002 0.418 0.417 0.000
αJ   0.015  0.015 0.021 -0.059 0.105 0.015 0.417 0.419 0.002
λ  -1.106
***  -1.187 0.277 -1.588 0.118 -1.232 0.494 0.364 -0.130
εA   0.000  0.000 0.005 -0.028 0.027 0.000 0.418 0.417 0.000
εB  -0.016  -0.012 0.032 -0.153 0.094 -0.015 0.419 0.411 -0.008
εG  -0.019  -0.023 0.015 -0.049 0.059 -0.029 0.431 0.415 -0.016
εH  -0.054  -0.064 0.034 -0.129 0.136 -0.078 0.453 0.409 -0.044
εK  -0.016  -0.018 0.024 -0.080 0.102 -0.023 0.428 0.415 -0.013
εJ  -0.011  -0.011 0.014 -0.061 0.055 -0.015 0.424 0.415 -0.009
ηF  -0.109  -0.098 0.078 -0.366 0.225 -0.132 0.388 0.466 0.079
ηE  -0.176  -0.158 0.108 -0.539 0.076 -0.177 0.374 0.448 0.074
σS   0.005  0.005 0.012 -0.069 0.073 0.007 0.414 0.419 0.005
σF  -0.538
***  -0.543 0.138 -1.028 0.123 -0.644 0.603 0.332 -0.271
LF  -1.023
**  -1.058 0.417 -2.116 0.604 -1.124 0.478 0.372 -0.106
LG  -0.007  -0.012 0.032 -0.088 0.125 -0.013 0.419 0.417 -0.001
LH  -0.019  -0.029 0.074 -0.225 0.317 -0.031 0.420 0.417 -0.003
MCF   0.107
**  0.101 0.054 -0.068 0.287 0.118 0.389 0.448 0.059
*, 
**, 
*** indicate a significance level of 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. 
Legend: εA, εB, εG, and εH are supply elasticities of inputs used in bread grain production (A = land, B = labor, G = 
investment goods; H = operating inputs);  αA, αB, and αG are factor shares of land labor and investment goods in 
bread grain production;  εK, εJ, are supply elasticities of inputs used in food production (J = labor, K = capital);  αj, 
is the factor share of labor in food production;  σS, and σS are elasticities of substitution between input factors in 
bread grain and food production respectively;  ηF, and ηF, are elasticities of demand for food and feed respectively;  
LF, LG, and LH are Lerner indices for the food industry, investment good industry and operating inputs industry 
respectively;  λ is the agricultural share of expenditures for bread grain products;  MCF are marginal cost of public 
funds. The elasticity of the Relative Social Costs with respect to the 19 parameters was calculated performing the 
following Monte Carlo experiment:  First, the 9,500 parameter sets and the estimated response function were 
used to calculate 9,500 RSC ￿base￿-values.  Second, the parameter sets were slightly changed by increasing 
all 9,500 values of the first parameter, e.g. α A, by 1% and calculating 9,500 RSC ￿new￿-values.  Third, 
subtracting the 9,500 new RSC values from the 9,500 base-values and dividing the difference by the base 
values lead to 9,500 elasticity values, i.e. the percentage change of the RSC with respect to a 1% change in 
the first parameter.  The left block of Table 3 reveals that at the mean (median) of all 9,500 calculated 
elasticity values a 1% change in the parameter α A (factor share of land in the production of bread grains) 
decreases the RSC by 0.007% (0.005%) with a standard deviation of 1.8%, a maximum value of 0.055% and 
a minimum value of ￿0.092%.  The same procedures lead to elasticities for all other parameters.  The fact 
that the minimum elasticities are negative and the maximum elasticities are positive for all parameters 
reveals how the effect of a change in one parameter depends on the levels of all other parameters.  Only four 
elasticities are significant different from zero at the 90% level or higher:  the agricultural share of 
expenditures for bread grain products (λ), the Lerner index of the downstream industry (LF), the elasticity of 
substitution at the food industry level (σF), and the marginal cost of public funds (MCF). 
 
Alternatively to the mean value in the left block of Table 3, the first column represents the percentage change 
in RSC, when one parameter is changed by 1% and all other parameters are kept unchanged at their mean 
values. The results in the first columns of the left and the right block do not differ significantly from each 
other. The second and third columns of the right block, RSCmin and RSCmax, do not denote percentage 
changes, but the values of Relative Social Cost, when one parameter is set respectively at the lower and 
upper bound of its associated range, and all other parameters are set at their mean values.  The last column, 
∆(RSC), simply indicates the difference in the absolute Relative Social Costs (∆(RSC) = RSCmax - RSCmin).  
This can be interpreted as the ￿imprecision￿ in RSC due to the fact that in the model, the parameters used are 
range estimates rather than point estimates.  The higher the absolute value of this last column, the greater the 
gain in the precision of the estimated RSC associated with a narrower parameter range.   
 
The parameters λ, σF and LF exhibit the widest ranges.  Hence, additional information on their actual values 




As a rule, governments defend their policy as efficient in common political statements.  Utilizing a three-
stage vertically structured model including upstream and downstream industries it was shown over a wide 
range of possible model parameter values that the Austrian bread grain policy was quite inefficient in 
meeting its two main objectives, namely supporting farm income and self-sufficiency.  In fact, the social cost 
could on average have been reduced by more than 40% by using the same policy instruments, but at efficient 
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